Arcezia
Worked example · Execution integrity

A worked example: an AI agent refunds $2,400 for an order that never existed.

A clean, well-formed, on-topic tool call executed a real, irreversible action — on a fact the agent made up. The problem isn’t the words. It’s whether the words are true.

An AI support agent is wired to a simple rule: only refund verified orders. It has a lookup_order tool and a process_refund tool. A customer writes in, upset, asking for a refund.

The agent works the ticket. Partway through its chain it states: “Order #A-4471 confirmed — $2,400, purchased 12 days ago, within refund window.” It calls process_refund(order_id="A-4471", amount=2400). The money leaves. The ticket closes. Handle time: 9 seconds. A clean, helpful resolution.

Except lookup_order was never called successfully. No tool ever returned order A-4471. The agent, under pressure to resolve the ticket, generated a plausible order — a realistic ID, a believable amount, a date inside the window — and then acted on its own invention. The refund was real. The order was fiction.

What the call looked like

Every property of the wording was fine. Asked “is this text safe and well-formed?”, the honest answer is yes.

The wording

Prompt injection — clean
Toxicity / safety — clean
Topic control — on-topic
PII / jailbreak — clean
Tool-call schema — valid

What the action rests on

Is the order real?
Did a tool establish it?
Or did the agent say so?

What was actually happening

The failure isn’t in the words. It’s in the gap between what the agent claimed (“order confirmed”) and what any tool established (nothing). The evidence that justified an irreversible action was fabricated. The lie is well-spoken.

The verdict that catches it

Arcezia sits in front of process_refund and asks a different question — not “are these words safe?” but “is the claim that authorizes this action backed by real evidence?”

◯ Verification certificatesample
Block Fabricated

Destructive action on a payment blocked. The agent claimed the order was confirmed — no matching order exists in any tool result. The evidence is fabricated. Action denied before execution.

What it found

confirmedRefund cannot be undoneprocess_refund moves money
refusedOrder existsClaimed by the agent (“#A-4471 confirmed”); no tool returned this order
not checkedWithin the refund windowCannot be checked for an order that does not exist
arcezia · payment_ops · process_refundsig: a7f3c9e1…4f1e6a9c

Not a probability. Not “72% suspicious.” A deterministic BLOCK with the reason attached — a verdict you can put in an audit log. No model in the loop.

Why this isn’t an edge case

In our internal fabrication test suite — actions justified by invented evidence, dressed up to look legitimate — Arcezia blocked all 71, before the action fired. The suite is reproducible — you can run it against your own agents and see where your stack lands.

Honest boundary

Arcezia checks whether an action is backed by evidence and authorized. It does not read the agent’s intent, and it will not catch a harmful action that is fully evidenced and within policy — that is a different problem. What it removes is the class of failure where an agent acts on something it never actually established.

Try it live

Send one of these actions through the real engine. The verdict below is computed live — not canned. Same verifier, signed certificate.

Your agents take real actions — refunds, deployments, writes. Each is authorized by a claim. Can you tell, before it executes, which claims are true because a tool proved it, and which are true because the model sounded confident?

Run it on your agents: Quickstart → See how Arcezia works